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Abstract
A DSGE-VAR approach was adopted to examine the managed exchange-
rate system at work in Singapore and to ask if the country had any rea-
son to fear oating the exchange rate and adopting a Taylor rule. The
results showed that, in terms of overall ination volatility, the exchange
rate rule had a comparative advantage over the Taylor rule when export-
price shocks were the major sources of real volatility while a Taylor rule
was preferable when domestic productivity shocks were dominant. The
exchange-rate rule also dominated the Taylor rule for reducing ination
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1 Introduction
Should Singapore fear oating its exchange rate by adopting a Taylor rule? 1
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) noted that many emerging markets retained a pref-
erence for a managed oat with much less exibility than is commonly assumed
by o¢ cial exchange-rate classication schemes. Lack of credibility of the mone-
tary authority or liability dollarization, they noted, are major reasons emerging
market countries have avoided oating and adopting a Taylor rule. However,
there could be other reasons which may be more relevant for a small, highly
open and fast growing economy such as Singapore.
Reecting the small open nature of its economy, Singapore has adopted (ef-
fectively, but not o¢ cially) an ination-targeting exchange rate centered mon-
etary policy framework.2 Given the open-economy trilemma, monetary policy
can only achieve two of the following three dimensions: monetary policy inde-
pendence, xed exchange rates, and open capital accounts. As a major nancial
centre, Singapore has chosen free capital mobility and could have chosen to tar-
get either the exchange rate or some other monetary variable, but not both.
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has opted to use the exchange
rate as opposed to the more conventional benchmark policy interest rate as its
policy operating tool (MAS, 2000).
This is not surprising as the exchange rate could be an e¤ective tool for
managing a highly open and trade-dependent economy. Singapore is highly
dependent on external demand, which constitutes about seventy percent of ag-
gregate demand. Moreover, domestic consumption has a high import content
 out of every Singapore dollar spent domestically, about fty cents goes to
imports. Being a price-taker in international markets, it follows that Singa-
pore is highly susceptible to imported ination. It appears that Singapore is
well served by an ination-targeting managed exchange rate-centered monetary
policy framework. This is a system with free capital mobility and with domes-
tic short-term interest rates determined by foreign interest rates, including a
time-varying risk premium.
Managing the exchange rate comes with a cost - the fear of speculative
attacks. With the exception of the Asian crisis period in 1997, the MAS has
successfully deterred speculators from attacking the domestic currency over the
past three decades. But it has been argued that it is the exibility accorded by
the managed exchange rate system that had aided Singapore in escaping from
the Asian crisis relatively unscathed. Singapores acceptance of market driven
depreciations in the wake of and amid the deepening of the Asian nancial
crisis deterred currency speculators from engineering over-depreciation in the
1The interest-rate feedback rule for ination targeting was extensived analyzed by Taylor
(1993) and is commonly known as the Taylor rule.
2 In practice, since 1981, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) adopts an intermedi-
ate exchange rate regime by targeting the Singapore dollar under a basket-band-crawl (BBC)
system (Khor et al, 2004; Williamson, 1999). Under this managed oat system, the Singapore
dollar is related to a trade-weighted basket (termed TWI) of currencies of its major trading
partners and competitors. Neither the component currencies, their assigned weights in the
basket, the central rate, nor the band limits are disclosed by the MAS.
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domestic currency (Yip, 2005). In other words, it was as if the Singapore dollar
was on a free oat during that period.3
The Asian nancial crisis raised awareness that pegged exchange rates and its
attendant insurance e¤ect exacerbated boom-bust cycles associated with capital
ows, thereby contributing to the crisis (Cossetti et al., 1999). This prompted
many central banks in East Asia to shift their focus from exchange rate stabil-
ity to price stability. In particular, crisis-hit countries like Indonesia, (South)
Korea, Philippines and Thailand announced the explicit adoption of ination
targeting and moved towards using interest rates as the key monetary policy
instrument. However, unless capital controls are imposed, the open economy
trilemma dictated that countries that adopted ination targeting should nec-
essarily have a freely oating exchange rate regime as well. Should Singapore
follow suit?4
The MASstated objective for monetary policy is "to ensure low ination as
a sound basis for sustained economic growth". In practice, then, the exchange
rate became the policy instrument to stabilize ination and output around their
desired target levels while the interest rate was e¤ectively tied to the foreign
rate. An alternative set-up would have been to use the interest rate as the
policy instrument, while the exchange rate adjusted to market forces. Should
Singapore oat its currency and adopt a Taylor rule?
The aim of the paper is to conduct counter-factual experiments and sim-
ulation analysis to determine whether the conduct of monetary policy would
have been more welfare enhancing had the interest rate been used as the policy
operating instrument instead of the exchange rate. In a VAR analysis of Singa-
pores monetary transmission mechanism, Chow (2005) found that the exchange
rate was more inuential than the interest rate as a source of macroeconomic
uctuations. However, the VAR methodology cannot be used to address the
question of "what if" had Singapore adopted an alternative policy rule. This
has to be examined in a framework where the estimated parameters were not
intrinsically linked to the historical policy settings - and thus not subject to
the so-called Lucas critique of policy analysis. Hence the framework adopted
in this paper belongs to the class of models called dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) New Keynesian models of the small open economy.
In the next section we specify a DSGE model of the Singapore economy with
its current exchange-rate regime and with nominal and real frictions in the form
of sticky wages and prices, habit persistence in consumption, and adjustment
costs for investment. We then discuss the results of a Bayesian estimation of
the model. Finally we undertake counterfactual simulations assuming a oating
3Of course, Singapores substantial amount of foreign reserves played a critical role in de-
terring speculative attacks. Further, strong economic fundamentals such as consistent scal
surplus, large current account surplus, maintenance of stable and consistent macroeconomic
policies, and a robust nancial system are important explanations why Singapore was rela-
tively less a¤ected by the Asian crisis.
4Some market participants have advocated a move to greater exibility in the exchange
rate to guard against the risk of policymakers misjudging the level of Singapores equilibrium
exchange rate. However, others have pointed out that increasing exibility in the TWI would
increase the risk of the Singapore dollar overshooting and is thus, destabilizing.
3
exchange rate system with a Taylor rule for the interest rate and perform welfare
comparisons under the two monetary regimes. The last section concludes.
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2 Model
The Singapore macro economy is modelled as the aggregate outcome of the
interactions of four sectors. The rst sector, the household, provides labor
services, owns the capital stock, makes consumption and investment decisions,
and holds domestic and foreign bonds. In supplying labor to the rms, the
household sets its wage in a monopolistically competitive fashion. All nancial
interactions are subsumed into this sector. The second sector, the production
sector, is mainly responsible for combining capital and labor to produce the
goods. It sets the prices of domestic goods in a monopolistically competitive
way. The third sector is the external sector. Singapore is a small open economy
and takes world prices and interest rates as exogenous variables. Finally, the
government sector buys domestic goods and services while collecting lump sum
taxes from households, and implements the policies under consideration, namely
exchange-rate management.
The equations of the model are standard in the literature, and we have
focussed on the key features of the Singapore economy associated with its high
degree of openness. We allowed for real-sector frictions, in the form of habit
persistence in consumption and adjustment costs in investment. There are two
forms of nominal stickiness: one in wage setting and the other in the setting of
domestic nal-goods prices.
Subsection 2.1 describes the decision rules with respect to the consumption
and investment of domestically-produced and imported goods, the holdings of
domestic and foreign bonds as well as the determination of the wage rate. The
pricing and employment decisions are described in subsection 2.2 along with
the determination of the rental price of capital. Subsection 2.3 contains the
processes describing the external sector while subsection 2.4 completes the model
with equations to describe the scal and monetary policies.
2.1 Household sector
The intertemporal welfare (V ) and utility function (U) for the household sector
are:5
V = E0
1X
t=0
tUt(Ct; Lt) (1)
Ut(:) =
(Ct   cCt 1)1 
1     
L1+$t
1 +$
(2)
where  is the discount factor, C is consumption with habit persistence parame-
ter c, L is labor services,  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, $ is the
Frisch labor supply elasticity, and  is the disutility of labor. The habit process
5Since the relationships between the micro (many households, di¤erentiated labour, and
monopolistic competition) and their macro (aggregate) counterparts are well-known, we have
only presented the aggregate equations here.
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is an external one, so that the habit stock at time t + i is based on the aver-
age past periods consumption, cCt+i 1; The symbol E0 is the expectations
operator at time t = 0:
The household budget equation is:
WtLt+R
k
tKt+ t+Tt+Rt 1Bt 1+(R

t 1+Ht 1)StB

t 1 = Bt+StB

t+P
c
t Ct+P
i
t It
(3)
where W is the wage rate, Rk is the nominal rental rate on capital K,   is
distributed prots, T is taxes and transfers; B (B) are domestic (foreign) bonds
while R (R) are the gross interest rates on domestic and foreign bonds. The
exchange rate, S; is expressed as domestic to foreign currency and H is a risk
premium. The price index for consumption is given by P c, and for investment
goods by P i. The nancial assets are state-contingent with one period maturity.
Following Devereux, Lane and Xu (2006), capital evolves according to the
following law of motion:
Kt =
"
It
Kt 1
  
2

It
Kt 1
  
2#
Kt 1 + (1  )Kt 1 (4)
where  is the depreciation rate and  is an adjustment cost factor,  > 0:
The household purchases consumption Ct and investment goods It;as well as
government and foreign bonds and pays lump sum taxes Tt: It rents capital
and supplies labor to rms, and receives wage income WtLt and rental income
from capital, RktKt:
The household sector takes P i; P c;W;Rk; R;R;H and S as given variables
and the paths for consumption (C), capital (K), domestic (B) and foreign
(B) bond holdings are obtained by solving the Lagrangean problem (maximize
present value of utility (2) subject to the budget constraint (3) and the law of
motion for capital (4)). The Euler equations are below:
(Ct   cCt 1) 
P ct
= 
(Ct+1   cCt) 
P ct+1
Rt (5)
RtSt = (R

t +Ht)St+1 (6)
Qt

1  

It
Kt 1
  

=

(Ct   cCt 1) 
P ct

P it (7)
Qt =

(Ct   cCt 1) 
P ct

Rkt
+ Qt+1
"

2

I2t+1
K2t

 2 2 + (1  )
#
(8)
where Qt is a Lagrange multiplier at time t for the law of motion of the capital
stock.
Household expenditures are for consumption (C) or for investment (I) at
respective prices P c; P i: Consumption and investment goods are mainly, but
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not totally, imported and they are modelled respectively as CES functions:
Ct =
h
(1  c)1=c
 
Cdt
(c 1)=c + 1=cc (Cmt )(c 1)=cic=(1 c) (9)
Cdt = (1  c)

P dt
P ct
 c
Ct (10)
Cmt = c

Pmt
P ct
 c
Ct (11)
P ct =
h
(1  c)
 
P dt
1 c + c (Pmt )1 ci1=(1 c) (12)
It =
h
(1  i)1=i
 
Idt
(i 1)=i + 1=ii (Imt )(i 1)=iii=(1 i) (13)
Idt = (1  i)

P dt
P it
 i
It (14)
Imt = i

Pmt
P it
 i
It (15)
P it =
h
(1  i)
 
P dt
1 i + i (Pmt )1 ii1=(1 i) (16)
where c, i are the respective share parameters and c; i represent the in-
tratemporal elasticities of substitution for consumption and investment. Equa-
tion (9) shows aggregate consumption Ct as comprising a domestic component
Cdt and an imported component C
m
t while equation (13) shows aggregate invest-
ment It as comprising a domestic component Idt and an imported component
Imt . The world (domestic) price for the imported (domestic) consumption and
investment goods are highly correlated and are represented as Pm (P d).
The Singaporean labor market does not clear, and wages are modelled as
staggered contracts with a fraction (1   w) renegotiated each period. House-
hold h chooses the optimal wage W ot by maximizing the expected discounted
utility subject to the demand for its labor Lht = Lt (W
o
t =Wt)
 w where w is a
parameter governing the degree of substitution. In aggregate, this behavior is
modelled in a similar manner to the Calvo sticky prices and the model is written
in recursive form as:
Wnumt = (Wt)
w+w$
 
L1+$t

+ w:W
num
t+1 (17)
W dent =

(Ct   cCt 1) 
P ct

(Wt)

Lt + w:W
den
t+1 (18)
(W ot )
1+w$ =
Wnumt
W dent
(19)
Wt =
h
w (Wt 1)
1 w + (1  w)(W ot )1 w
i 1
1 w (20)
where, Wnumt and W
den
t are auxiliary variables in the formula.
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2.2 Production sector
Aggregate demand (Yt) comes from domestic consumption (Cdt ), government
spending (G), exports (X) and investment (Idt ):
6
Yt = C
d
t +Gt +Xt + I
d
t (21)
Aggregate supply is a function of capital and labor:
Yt = K

t (ZtLt)
1  (22)
log(Zt) = log(Zt 1) + zt ; 
z
t  N(0; 2z) (23)
where Zt is an economy-wide unit-root technology shock and  is a parameter
that determines the degree of capital intensity for production. The prots of
the rms is given by the following aggregate relationship, and distributed to the
households:
 t = PtYt  WtLt  RktKt (24)
Maximizing prots also implies the following relationship:
Wt
(1  )Rkt
=
Kt
Lt
(25)
Firms are monopolistically competitive and they set the price for goods
sold both domestically and in foreign markets. According to the Calvo price
setting system, there are forward-looking price setters and backward looking
price setters. Let p be the probability of persistence. Then since the demand
for the product from rm j is given by Yt

P jt =Pt
 p
, we may write the optimal
(aggregate) price, P ot in recursive form as follows:
7
At =
 
Rkt

W 1 t
Zt
 
1
()

(1  )1 
!
(26)
P ot =
Pnumt
P dent
(27)
Pnumt = Yt (Pt)
p At + pP
num
t+1 (28)
P dent = Yt (Pt)
p + pP
den
t+1 (29)
Pt =
h
p (Pt 1)
1 p + (1  p) (P ot )1 p
i 1
1 p (30)
where A is the marginal cost and p is a substitution parameter; P
num
t and
P dent are auxiliary variables in the formula.
6To simplify the analysis, we assume that output is transformed into goods for di¤erent
end-users and that the markets are segmented.
7For more details of the derivation see for example, Walsh (2003), chapter 5: Money,
Output and Ination in the Short-run
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2.3 External Sector
Singapore is a very open economy and highly susceptible to international fac-
tors. Since it is a very small open economy external forces are modelled as
autoregressive processes. The foreign interest rate R is assumed to follow the
following autoregressive process (in log terms):
log(Rt ) = 
r log(Rt 1) + (1  r) log(R) + rt rt ~N(0; 2r*) (31)
Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), the small open economy is closed,
by allowing the risk premium (Ht) to react to the deviation of foreign debt:
log(Ht) = 
h log(Ht 1)+(1 h)
 
H + ' log(Bt 1=Bt )

+ht ; 
h
t  N(0; 2h)
(32)
with ' < 0; the greater the deviation of (lagged) foreign assets from its steady-
state level, the lower the risk premium. The feedback loop from debt to risk pre-
mium also ensures that foreign debt stabilizes. Foreign assets evolve as follows
and, following evidence reported in Chew, Ouliaris and Meng (2009), exchange-
rate changes are passed on fully to the domestic prices of imported goods.
P xt Xt   Pmt (Imt + Cmt ) = St(Bt  Bt 1(Rt 1 +Ht 1)) (33)
Pmt = StP
m
t (34)
P xt = StP
x
t (35)
The internationally determined import prices Pm

t and export prices P
x
t are
modelled as autoregressive stochastic processes:8
log(Pmt ) = 
pm log(Pm

t 1) + (1  pm) log(Pm) + pmt ; mt ~N(0; 2pm)
(36)
log(P xt ) = 
px log(P xt 1) + (1  px) log(P x) + pxt ; xt  N(0; 2px)
(37)
Since Singapore is a very open economy, the index of openness  is obtained
from:
Pt = P
d
t (1 ) + P xt  (38)
where  is a measure of the share of exports in economic activity (see Monacelli
and Gali, 2005).9
The Singapore economy is also sensitive to world output. The demand for
export goods by trading partners is modelled in a similar way to the Singaporean
8 In the empirical section, we have also modelled these processes to allow for some cross-
e¤ects in a VAR framework. We nd that the cross-terms were not signicant.
9The coe¢ cient  drops out in the log-linear model, but an estimate can be derived from
the steady state conditions. The estimate is used in computing utility/welfare in the counter-
factual experiments.
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demand for imported goods:
Xt = f

P xt
Pwt
 f
Y t (39)
log(Y t ) = 
y log(Y t 1) + (1  y) log(Y ) + yt ; yt  N(0; 2y) (40)
where f represents the share of imported goods in the trading partnerstotal
expenditure, f is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution for domestic and
imported components, Y t is a measure of the GDP of trading partners, and P
w
t
is the world price index, normalized to unity. The trading partnersGDP, Y ;
is, again, modelled as an autoregressive process.
2.4 Government Sector
The Treasury/Central Bank receives taxes and borrows to nance government
expenditure. The evolution of domestic bonds (Bt) is below:10
Bt = P
d
t Gt +Bt 1Rt 1   Tt (41)
where government spending Gt is assumed to follow an exogenous autoregressive
process and includes a normally distributed innovation g with variance 2g :
log(Gt) = 
g log(Gt 1) + (1  g) log(G) + gt ; gt  N(0; 2g) (42)
The aim of monetary policy is to manage the exchange rate to target ina-
tion, that is the exchange rate is engineered to appreciate to reduce domestic
ination. Following McCallum (2006)11 , the behavior of the Monetary Author-
ity of Singapore is modelled as following an exchange rate rule:12
log(St+1=St) = 
s log(St=St 1)  (1  s) (log(ct+1=c));  > 0 (43)
The parameter s measures the persistence and  is a reaction coe¢ cient, spec-
ied so that the exchange rate appreciates when ination rises. The gross
ination is for the consumer price index, with ct+1 = P
c
t+1=P
c
t .
13
10We assume that the exogenous taxes prohibit that debt from becoming non-stationary.
11We note that this specication does not include an output-gap term. This does not mean
that variations in growth are not considered, only that they are considered via their impact
on ination.
12MAS announces its exchange rate policy stance, in its semiannual monetary policy cycle,
through a Monetary Policy Statement. Possible adjustments include: changes to the crawl in
the central parity, re-centering of the policy band, changing the width of the band of uctu-
ations. Essentially, the exchange rate is used as an intermediate monetary policy instrument
to achieve the primary objective of non-inationary growth. In a sense, monetary policy is
operated in Singapore as sort of a hybrid between the BBC and ination targeting. In prac-
tice, an adjustable band is used to track the movement of its instrument, while setting its
instrument in a way to hit intermediate targets as a means to control ination and achieve
non-inationary growth (Khor et al. 2004). In this way, the BBC system can be operated to
achieve the same objectives as ination targeting.
13Note that the term (1  s) log(S) has been dropped because log(S) = 0.
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In summary, the model may be viewed as containing an aggregate supply
equation (22) and an aggregate demand equation (21) with associated equations
to describe the determination of consumption, investment government expendi-
ture, exports and imports (of consumption and investment type goods). The
model also includes equations to describe the demand for the factors of pro-
duction (labor and capital) along with the rental price of capital and wage rate
with the complication that wages and prices are Calvo-sticky. The international
exogeneously determined variables are modelled as autoregressive processes.
2.5 Log-Linear Model
Overall, the model contained 7 processes (Y t ; P
m
t ; P
x
t ; R

t ;Ht; Gt; Zt) and a
number of autoregressive, policy reaction, and deep structural parameters (see
Table 2 for list). Following standard practice, the non-stationary variables were
transformed into stationary variables using two types of manipulations. The
rst was to detrend real variables by productivity (eyt = log(Yt=Zt)) and the
second was to recast price variables into relative terms (and thus to work with
t = log(Pt=Pt 1)): The model was then log-linearized for estimation.
3 Empirical Analysis
We estimated the model for seven stochastic shocks: for government spend-
ing, foreign trading partnersweighted GDP, import and export price ination,
foreign interest rates, the risk premium, and productivity. We used seven observ-
ables: government spending, weighted GDP of trading partners14 , import price
ination, the foreign interest rate, the risk premium (calculated as the domes-
tic interest di¤erential less the realized change in the exchange rate), domestic
GDP growth and ination. With the exception of the foreign interest rate (LI-
BOR) and the risk premium, all of the observables were expressed as log rst
di¤erences. The estimation was carried out for the sample period 1985.1-2009.4.
The results are presented in the following sections. The estimated para-
meters were based on two methodologies (the DSGE and the DSGE-VAR) as a
check for robustness of estimates. We examined the shocks, the impulse response
functions and the conditional variance decompositions. Using information from
the extracted implied shocks, we also interpreted how they had contributed to
changes in the growth of GDP and ination over the sample period.
3.1 Estimation: DSGE and DSGE/VAR
We estimated the model for Singapore in a pure DSGE framework as well as in
a DSGE/VAR framework, following Del Negro, Marco and Schorfheide (2004,
14This series is constructed by Abeyshinghe and Forbes (2005) and the data source is
http://www.fas.nus.edu.sg/ecs/esu/data.html. It is an export share weighted average of the
real GDP of the following countries: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand,
Taiwan, USA and OECD as one group. To allow for changes in the country composition of
Singapore trade, the export shares are computed as 12-quarter moving averages.
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2010), Adjemian, Darracq and Moyen (2008), and An and Kang (2009). The
intuition for using the hybrid DSGE/VAR approach came from recognizing that
a pure DSGE model could su¤er from specication errors, and that the explana-
tory power of the model could be improved by the use of a non-structural VAR
model. The weight of the pure VAR, relative to the pure DSGE model, was
given by the ratio 1=(1 + ): If  = 0, the pure VAR model explained all the
variation in the data, and if  =1; the pure DSGE explained the variation in
the data without any input from the VAR15 . The advantage of using the hy-
brid DSGE/VAR Bayesian model was thus to provide a specication test of the
DSGE model relative to the widely used non-structural alternative, the VAR,
with 0 <  <1 indicating the merit of the DSGE relative to the VAR.
Table 1: Marginal Likelihood
DSGE DSGE/VAR
    = 1:303
Laplace Approximation 2127.049 2185.322
Modied Harmonic Mean 2124.905 2182.981
Notes: Data sources for all tables and gures in this paper are IMF, International
Financial Statistics, Singapore Department of Statistics online time series database,
Sinstat Time Seres Online, https://app.sts.singstat.gov.sg/dots_index.asp, and au-
thorscalculations based on monte-carlo markov chain simulations
Table 1 show the relative t of the DSGE model to a VAR model. The best
t was a median  = 1:303 based on both the Laplace and Harmonic Mean
measurements of the Marginal Likelihood. As expected, the DSGE/VAR had
a higher marginal likelihood than the pure DSGE model. Given this result, we
made use of the DSGE/VAR parameters for more detailed model analysis.
3.2 Parameter and Volatility Estimates
All of the structural parameters (for example behavioral parameters ;$; dy-
namic parameters g; r; standard deviations of the shocks parameters 2z; 
2
g;
were estimated, except for the discount factor  which was calibrated for a
steady-state annual gross interest rate of 1.04.16 In the log-linearized model, we
specied the steady-state share of consumption to GDP at 0.6, and the steady-
state share of government spending to GDP at 0.1. These ratios were the mean
values of actual data. The net export ratio was set at 0.3.
Table 2 shows the priors and the posterior estimates under the pure DSGE
and the DSGE/VAR framework for the median  = 1:303: The table contains
the median and mean values of the Bayesian estimates for 200,000 simulations
15However, we also note that stimating a pure DSGE is not identical to estimation of a
DSGE/VAR with  =1; since the DSGE/VAR relies on a nite lag structure.
16Since the model is in log-linear deviations, there is no need to calibrate the model for
parameters which a¤ect the steady state, as suggested by Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno
(2007). We also abstract from tax e¤ects because they are small and only a¤ect the bond
accummulation equation. The shares are sample averages.
12
in four blocks, including the inmum and supremum of each estimate for a 95%
condence interval.
The priors were those commonly used in Bayesian models. We followed
closely the specications of Teo (2009) who estimated a DSGE model for Tai-
wan. The intratemporal elasticity of substitution for investment and for foreign
demand, i and f were set at 1.5 while the intratemporal elasticity for con-
sumption, c was set at 5, following evidence for this parameter presented by
Alolfson, Laseen, Linde and Villani (2007). The prior for the adjustment cost
coe¢ cient for investment, , was set at 200, in order to ensure that the volatility
of investment matched the observed volatility in the data.
With respect to the di¤erences between the DSGE and DSGE/VAR esti-
mates, the parameters g, y for the autoregressive process for government
spending and foreign GDP growth showed more persistence in the pure DSGE
than in the DSGE/VAR framework. For the remaining parameters, the 95%
condence interval estimates for the DSGE and DSGE/VAR frameworks showed
considerable overlaps.
Looking at the degrees of price and wage stickiness, the results showed that
the Calvo price stickiness parameter estimate was much lower than those com-
monly found in models of the US or UK, but its 95% condence interval was
within the corresponding condence interval for Taiwan [0.48 0.77], reported by
Teo (2009). It would appear, however that wages was a lot more exible than
prices in the Singapore economy. Reforms were implemented in the Singapore
labor market (around late 1980s) to promote a more exible wage system by
encouraging companies to pay both a base rate and a variable component linked
to productivity and protability.
Table 2 also contain the volatility estimates. In general, with the exception
of px; the estimated volatilities were slightly lower in the DSGE/VAR model
than in the DSGE model.
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Table 2: Prior and Posterior Estimates
Coe¢ cient
Estimates Priors Posteriors Posteriors
DSGE DSGE/VAR
Dist Mean Std.Dev. Mean .025 .975 Mean .025 .975
g Beta 0.500 0.200 0.902 0.867 0.937 0.649 0.517 0.777
y Beta 0.500 0.200 0.897 0.860 0.932 0.732 0.627 0.832
r Beta 0.500 0.200 0.956 0.931 0.985 0.927 0.872 0.974
px Beta 0.500 0.200 0.947 0.924 0.972 0.842 0.749 0.935
pm Beta 0.500 0.200 0.211 0.095 0.316 0.201 0.067 0.326
s Beta 0.500 0.200 0.104 0.023 0.180 0.158 0.030 0.282
h Beta 0.500 0.200 0.424 0.278 0.569 0.253 0.088 0.410
' Beta 0.010 0.100 0.005 0.002 0.008 0.007 0.002 0.013
c Beta 0.500 0.200 0.487 0.406 0.568 0.496 0.413 0.577
i Beta 0.800 0.200 0.799 0.709 0.889 0.799 0.721 0.881
p Beta 0.500 0.200 0.441 0.333 0.545 0.435 0.321 0.554
w Beta 0.500 0.200 0.290 0.191 0.379 0.246 0.163 0.333
w Normal 6.000 1.000 5.662 3.920 7.468 5.626 3.869 7.537
 Normal 2.500 0.200 2.682 2.395 2.995 2.578 2.255 2.925
$ Beta 0.500 0.200 0.176 0.019 0.339 0.233 0.009 0.514
 Beta 0.500 0.050 0.415 0.340 0.496 0.445 0.362 0.523
 Normal 1.500 0.200 1.558 1.195 1.900 1.754 1.277 2.194
 Beta 0.020 0.005 0.019 0.011 0.027 0.020 0.013 0.028
c Normal 5.000 0.500 2.305 2.012 2.619 2.312 2.061 2.573
i Normal 1.500 0.200 1.261 1.004 1.497 1.249 1.017 1.453
f Normal 1.500 0.200 1.395 1.165 1.640 1.332 1.069 1.573
 Normal 200 50 245.166 162.138 324.906 251.325 165.709 337.836
c Beta 0.500 0.200 0.756 0.637 0.887 0.736 0.605 0.869
 Normal 0.700 0.300 0.696 0.663 0.723 0.698 0.663 0.726
 Uniform [0 5]    1.330 0.996 1.654
Volatility Estimates
Priors Posteriors Posteriors
DSGE DSGE/VAR
Dist Mean Std.Dev. Mean .025 .975 Mean .025 .975
z Inv.gamma 0.01 0.5 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.005
g Inv.gamma 0.01 0.5 0.025 0.022 0.028 0.019 0.016 0.022
y

Inv.gamma 0.01 0.5 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.005
r Inv.gamma 0.01 0.5 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
p
x
Inv.gamma 0.01 0.5 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.009 0.004 0.013
p
m
Inv.gamma 0.01 0.5 0.024 0.021 0.026 0.018 0.015 0.021
q Inv.gamma 0.01 0.5 0.015 0.013 0.017 0.012 0.010 0.014
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Notes: g; y; r; px; pm; s; h are the autoregressive parameters for gov-
ernment spending, foreign GDP, foreign interest rate, import prices, export prices,
exchange rate and risk premium; ' is the feeback parameter from debt to risk pre-
mium; c, i are the share parameters for consumption and investment; p is the
probability of persistence; w is the fraction of wage contracts not renegotiated each
period; w is the degree of substitution for optimum wage;  is the coe¢ cient of rel-
ative risk aversion; $ is the Frisch labor supply elasticity;  is the degree of capital
intensity for production;  is a reaction coe¢ cient of exchange rate to ination;  is
the depreciation rate; c; i, f are the intratemporal elasticity of substitution for
consumption, investment, and domestic versus imported components;  is an adjust-
ment cost factor c is the consumption habit persistence parameter;  is a measure
of the share of exports in economic activity;  is related to the weight of the pure
VAR, relative to the pure DSGE model; and z; g; y; r; px; pm; h are the
standard deviation of the shocks to productivity, government spending, foreign GDP,
foreign interest rate, import prices, export prices and risk premium.
3.3 Estimated Shocks
Figure 1 shows the smoothed shocks extracted from the estimation of the
DSGE/VAR model and they appear to conrm our a priori perceptions. As
reected in the negative shocks in foreign GDP, the economy of Singapore was
hit by a succession of external shocks from mid 1990s to early 2000. These
included the 1996-97 downturn in the global electronics industry, the 1997-98
Asian nancial crisis, the 2001 burst of the information technology dot.com bub-
ble and the 2003 outbreak of the SARS respiratory disease. In response to the
various episodes of economic slowdown, the government introduced cost-cutting
measures and brought forward various social infrastructure projects. Hence,
government shocks were economic drivers from mid 1990s until early 2000.
Export demand was on an uptrend from mid 2000 till the lead up to the
global nancial crisis, not least because of the growing importance of China as
a market for Singaporean goods as well as because of the intensifying trade link-
ages in the region through an expansion of cross-border production networks.
In fact, changes in external demand accounted for approximately 75% of the
changes in Singapores real total demand during that period. This explained
the climb in export prices prior to 2008. Following the onset of the global
nancial crisis (accompanied by a huge drop in foreign GDP), the Singapore
economy experienced a sharp contraction with GDP growth plunging to -9.5%
in the rst quarter of 2009. In addition to the high import content of exports,
the propensity to import goods for domestic production or consumption in Sin-
gapore was also very high and estimated to be around 0.8. Reecting the very
high propensity to import, import prices collapsed following the onset of the
global nancial crisis.
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Figure 1: Smoothed Shocks. Source: Calculations from Model
Predictions
As for the shocks to productivity, there was a noticeable surge prior to the
lead up of the global nancial crisis. This could be partly attributed to the
inux of foreign labor, including high skilled ones, into Singapore during that
period. For instance, permanent residents grew by 8.1% between 2004 and 2009
while non-local workers made up 35% of the workforce by 2009.
With respect to the other shocks, the model showed declines in world interest
rates after 2000 and again in 2008. There was a huge shock to the risk premium
in the mid 1980s as Singapore entered into a deep recession in 1985 caused
by uncompetitive exports and high labor costs. Subsequently, the uncertainty
around late 1990s could be attributed to the onset of the 1997-98 Asian nancial
crisis.
3.4 Impulse Response Paths
Figures 2 and 3 show the response paths generated by shocks for GDP and
ination. The grey areas represent the 95% uncertainty bands. The results are
in keeping with theoretical propositions. Productivity, government spending,
and foreign GDP unambiguously a¤ected GDP growth positively, while foreign
interest rates and the risk premium had negligible impact e¤ects (the condence
bands include zero even in the short run). An increase in export price ination
had negative e¤ects on GDP growth through the export demand channel while
a positive shock to import price ination resulted in a switch in demand to
domestic products by consumers.
For ination, an increase in demand via either government spending or for-
eign GDP led to higher ination. Import price ination, foreign interest rates
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and the risk premium generated higher ination through the cost channel. Since
most of the ination in Singapore was imported, it is not surprising that higher
ination would be positively related to higher foreign interest rates, which in
turn were related to higher world ination. An increase in export price ination
caused a fall in foreign demand, which led to a fall in domestic ination. Pro-
ductivity shocks generated higher ination in this model because the demand
e¤ects dominated the supply e¤ects.
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Figure 2: Impulse Response Paths for GDP Growth.
Source: Calculations from Monte Carlo markov chain
simulations.
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Paths for Ination. Source:
Calculations from Monte Carlo markov chain simulations.
3.5 Conditional Variance Decomposition
Table 3 gives the conditional variance decomposition of GDP and ination for
the seven shocks of the model for horizons of one, four, eight, twelve, sixteen
and twenty quarters. The results showed that export-price ination shocks
dominated the variability of GDP at all of the horizons, explaining more than
seventy percent of the total variation. The only other shocks that matter, in
decreasing order of importance, were import-price ination (a¤ecting the cost of
investment goods), productivity, and foreign GDP. Government spending and
the risk premium had negligible e¤ects. For ination, productivity shocks mat-
tered the most, with some contribution from import and export price ination
and world interest rate shocks.
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Table 3: Variance Decomposition
Shock: 1 4 8 12 16 20
GDP
z 0.080 0.074 0.073 0.072 0.072 0.072
g 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
y

0.044 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045
r 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
px 0.773 0.734 0.737 0.738 0.738 0.738
pm 0.091 0.136 0.134 0.134 0.134 0.134
h 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ination
z 0.811 0.775 0.756 0.745 0.739 0.736
g 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
y

0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
r 0.020 0.050 0.071 0.084 0.091 0.095
px 0.066 0.065 0.066 0.065 0.065 0.065
pm 0.100 0.107 0.104 0.103 0.102 0.102
h 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: z; g; y; r; px; pm; h are the standard deviation of the shocks to
productivity, government spending, foreign GDP, foreign interest rate, import prices,
export prices and risk premium. Source: Calculations from Monte Carlo markov
chain simulations.
3.6 Historical Shock Decomposition
This section presents historical shock decompositions to gauge the relative im-
portance of each of the exogenous shocks for key endogenous variables of the
model. The decompositions also show when, during the sample periods, partic-
ular shocks became more important.
Figures 4 and 5 picture the historical shock decomposition for GDP growth
and ination for the sample. Consider rst the historical decomposition of
output. As discussed earlier in section 3.1.3, Singapore went into deep recession
in 1985 as high wage costs eroded export competitiveness. This was reected
in the negative shocks from productivity and export prices at the beginning of
the sample period. The subsequent recovery was aided by a boost to external
demand, with foreign GDP playing an important positive role in the late 1980s,
as well as a rebound in export price. However, the role of foreign GDP turned
negative as the recession in the US and parts of Europe in the early 1990s
dampened growth in Singapore in that period. Meanwhile, the large import
price shocks in the early 1990s could be attributed to high oil prices precipitated
by the 1991 Gulf war.
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Figure 4: Historical Shock Decomposition of GDP Growth. Source:
Calculations from Monte Carlo markov chain simulations.
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Figure 5: Historical Shock Decomposition of Ination. Source:
Calculations from Monte Carlo markov chain simulations.
In the mid 1990s, the contribution of government spending increased as the
Singapore government responded to the economic downswing triggered by the
global electronics downturn. Towards the end of 1990s, there was a large nega-
tive shock to foreign interest rate at the outbreak of the Asian nancial crisis.
The Singapore economy was hit by a sequence of external shocks in the early
2000s which prompted the government to implement counter-cyclical measures
and boost spending. Hence, both the foreign GDP and government spending
played important roles in that period. With the inux of skilled foreign labor
from mid 2000s until the onset of the global nancial crisis, shocks to produc-
21
tivity became more important after 2005. At the onset of the global nancial
crisis, foreign interest rate, external demand and export prices collapsed. The
noticeable negative e¤ect of export price ination in 2008/09 stood out very
clearly, much more than import price ination. Overall, the role of the export
price ination shocks were more substantial than the contribution of shocks to
government spending, foreign GDP, and foreign interest rate. The contribution
of risk premium shocks to growth was of least importance.
With respect to ination, we saw the strong contribution of productivity
driving ination after 2005. Due to the high import content in all expenditure
components, we expected imported ination to play an important role in Sin-
gapores ination. Similarly, the openness of the Singapore economy suggested
that external demand contributed signicantly to Singapores aggregate demand
which in turn added to domestic price pressures. However, the historical de-
composition showed that the collapse in the foreign GDP of trading partners,
and shocks emanating from import prices, especially in the early 1990s (after
the Gulf War), and in 2008, at the time of the nancial crisis, were of lesser
magnitudes. This was a reection of the central banks ability to maintain price
stability through the use of the exchange rate as a policy tool to target low
ination. Firstly, an exchange rate appreciation had a direct e¤ect on domestic
prices by lowering the prices of imported services as well as imported interme-
diate and nal products. Secondly, a reduction in aggregate demand, caused
by an appreciation of the local currency, alleviated inationary pressures indi-
rectly through the easing of domestic costs such as wages. The central bank was
e¤ective in managing the exchange rate in response to shocks to import price
ination and external demand conditions throughout the sample period.
4 Counterfactual Taylor Rule
Before examining whether the interest rate could be used to conduct monetary
policy, we checked whether the Singapore economy was interest rate sensitive.
Singapores extensive network of international nancial and trade linkages with
the attendant huge and rapid capital ows, including a very liberal policy to-
wards foreign direct investment, may have resulted in an economy that was not
responsive to interest rate changes.
Figure 6, which depicts the ex post three-month uncovered interest di¤eren-
tial between the LIBOR and Singapore, revealed that the di¤erentials were quite
di¤erent from zero. As pointed out by Yip (2003) they were substantially larger
in magnitude compared with corresponding gures from Hong Kong. These
uctuations in the di¤erentials suggested some scope for managing the domes-
tic interest rate, that is the MAS could have exercised a degree of control over
domestic interest rates by varying the amount of liquidity injections.
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Figure 6: Interest Di¤erentials between 3-month SIBOR and
Singapore Dollar 3-Month Interbank Rate. SIBOR is the US Dollar
Deposit Rate in Singapore. Source: Monetary Authority of
Singapore Financial Database.
It is natural to ask then, if Singapore could have done better with an ination
targeting rule based on the Taylor rule? The typical formulation of the Taylor
rule has the interest rate as a function of its own lag, as well as a function of
the deviation of ination from its target rate, and an output gap measure:
log(Rt) = 
r log(Rt 1) + (1  r)(log(ct=c)) + (1  r)y(log(Yt=Y flext ))
0  r  1;  > 1; y  0 (44)
where ct is the gross consumption price ination rate, c is the target (steady-
state) ination rate. The output gap is dened as (log(Yt=Y
flex
t )); where Yt is
GDP and Y flext is the level of output in a exible wage and price economy. The
parameter r is the smoothing coe¢ cient,  is the ination coe¢ cient and y is
the output gap coe¢ cient. Determinacy of ination requires that the ination
rate coe¢ cient be greater than unity, hence  > 1:
If this interest rate rule were to be adopted, it would replace equation (43),
and the counterfactual experiment would be for the case with policy-determined
interest rate and market determined exchange rate (in contrast to the current
practice of a policy determined exchange rate and a market determined inter-
est rate). The relationship between interest and exchange rates, embodied in
equation (6) is una¤ected.
Hence, in the counterfactual experiment, the exchange rate rule was replaced
with an interest rate rule. More specically, when the exchange rate is managed,
23
the domestic rate is determined to satisfy the interest parity relationship and
when the interest rate is managed, the exchange rate is determined to satisfy the
interest parity relationship. In both cases, the risk premium is pre-determined
as a function of the deviation of the lagged value of foreign assets from its
steady-state level.
Given that we had acknowledged a certain degree of model misspecication,
by making use of the DSGE/VAR estimates of the model, further assumptions
were needed for counterfactual simulation. Del Negro and Schorfheide (2010)
explored two alternatives in the context of the DSGE/VAR framework. One was
to assume that the discrepancies between the DSGE and empirical VAR model
were policy invariant. The second was to take misspecication into account
through draws on the prior distributions of the parameters, conditional on the
counterfactual policy regime. Given that the DSGE and DSGE/VAR parameter
condence intervals showed a considerable degree of overlap, as noted in our
discussion of the results presented in Table 2, we assumed that the relatively
small degree of misspecication was policy invariant.
Since the Taylor rule was the counterfactual, we obtained the coe¢ cient
values for this policy alternative from optimization of the welfare function, given
by equation (2), conditional on the parameters obtained from the DSGE/VAR
model. From numerical optimization of the model, the following estimates
emerged for the couterfactual optimal Taylor rule: br = 0:15; b = 1:025;by = 0:425:
We compared the performance of the model using the actual and counter-
factual optimal Taylor rule in three ways. First, the paths of ination and
the output gap were examined over the estimation period, assuming that both
regimes were subjected to the same set of smoothed shocks. Second, the im-
pulse response paths for ination and the output gap, for all of the shocks,
were examined under the two regimes. Third, the distributions of ination and
output gap volatility, over 1000 stochastic realizations, were examined with the
sample size equal to the historical sample.
4.1 Comparisons
4.1.1 Historical and Counterfactual Simulations
Figures 7 and 8 picture the paths of ination and the output gap predicted by
the model when the smoothed shocks (for productivity, the world interest rate,
the risk premium, government spending, world GDP, and export and import
price ination) were used as the innovations in the model. The two paths were
quite close.
The standard deviation of ination in the counterfactual regime was higher
than under the actual exchange rate regime (0.089 vs 0.067), while the output
gap volatilities were virtually the same (0.025 in both regimes). Figure 5 showed
that the drop in the output gap under the counterfactual regime at the time
of the Asian crisis was slightly less, but following the world crisis of 2008, the
swings in the output gap were of equal magnitude under both regimes. The drop
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in demand was due to the collapse of foreign GDP, which neither the exchange
rate nor the domestic interest rate could stabilize in any way.
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Figure 7: Ination under Base and Counterfactual Paths. Source:
Calculations from Monte Carlo markov chain simulations.
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Figure 8: Output Gap under Base and Counterfactual Paths.
Source: Calculations from Monte Carlo markov chain simulations.
4.1.2 Impulse Response Paths
Figures 9 and 10 picture the impulse response paths of and ination and the
output gap under the actual and counterfactual policy regimes for the seven
shocks estimated for the model. While the paths were generally close, there
were a number of di¤erences in the initial response.
In response to a productivity shock, ination rose under the exchange-rate
rule but fell under the Taylor rule. The reason for the di¤erent responses was
that the productivity shock also increased the output gap. Since the Taylor
rule responded to the output gap, with an increase in the interest rate, ination
fell following the productivity shock in this regime. Ination was also more
responsive to an import-price ination shock under the Taylor rule than in the
base exchange rate regime. The reason for this result is straightforward. While
ination targeting could diminish the e¤ects of import price ination changes on
domestic-currency prices, changes in the exchange rate form a major component
of domestic ination.
The impulse response analysis suggested that one rule might have been more
useful than the other for stabilizing ination, depending on the nature of the
shocks a¤ecting the economy. When productivity shocks were dominant, the
Taylor rule appeared to be more e¤ective, but when foreign price shocks domi-
nated, the exchange-rate rule was preferable. We discuss this in greater detail,
below, where we take up the comparative advantage of the two instruments for
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productivity and foreign ination shocks.
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Figure 9: Impulse Response Paths of Ination for
Ination under Base and Counterfactual Regimes.
Source: Calculations from Monte Carlo markov chain
simulations.
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Figure 10: Impulse Response Paths for Output Gap
under Base and Counterfactual Regimes. Source:
Calculations from Monte Carlo markov chain simulations.
27
4.1.3 Stochastic Simulations
So far, we have examined the response of the model to the historical smoothed
shocks or to a one period shock, with all other innovations held at zero. For a
more complete picture, we examined the volatilities (based on second moments)
of ination and the output gap, as well as the two alternative policy instru-
ments, the rate of depreciation of the exchange rate and the interest rate, for
1000 stochastic simulations based on random draws of the shocks from their
underlying distributions. Each draw was the size of the historical sample.
The distributions of the volatility measures in Figure 11 showed a clear
volatility trade-o¤ in the choice of policy instrument. Under the exchange-rate
rule, the depreciation was much less volatile and the interest rate more volatile,
than under an interest-rate based rule.
The volatility of ination would be slightly increased had the monetary au-
thority switched from an exchange-rate based ination targeting regime to an
interest-rate based regime. However, since both policies were aimed at man-
aging ination, the di¤erences would be small. What was surprising was the
result for the output gap - there was virtually no di¤erence between the volatil-
ities under both regime even though the comparison was between an estimated
exchange rate depreciation rule with an optimal Taylor rule.
To understand this result, we derived an optimal (welfare-maximing) depre-
ciation rule, given the shocks of the model, and we found that the optimal rule
delivered an output gap coe¢ cient of zero, with a lower coe¢ cient on ination
(1.05) and a larger smoothing coe¢ cient on lagged depreciation (0.675) than
the corresponding estimated coe¢ cients of 1.72 and 0.145. In other words, the
base exchange rate rule was close to the optimal rule. Thus, the counterfactual
Taylor rule and the exchange-rate rule represented simple optimal rules, with
nearly identical results on the output gap.
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Figure 11: Volatility Distributions under Base and Counterfactual
Regimes. Source: Calculations from Monte Carlo markov chain
simulations.
To interpret the di¤erences in the welfare between the two regimes, we calcu-
lated the implied habit-adjusted consumption compensation index required to
equalize the welfare of the representative household in the two regimes, following
Schmidt-Grohe and Uribe (2007). A positive value implied that the household in
the counterfactual scenario was worse o¤ and needed a positive habit-adjusted
consumption compensation to have the same welfare as the household in the
base scenario. A negative value meant that the household was better o¤ in the
counterfactual scenario, and would require a reduction in consumption to be
equal to the welfare realized in the base scenario.
The mean compensation from the stochastic simulations was -0.0025%, im-
plying that the household was only very minimally worse o¤, a quarter of a
percent of a percent, of a unit of habit-adjusted consumption, under the base
exchange rate regime relative to the counterfactual Taylor rule.
4.2 A Comparative Advantage for Policy Regimes?
The analysis thus far showed that the optimal (welfare-maximizing) Taylor rule,
based on the lagged interest rate, ination and the output gap, reduced ina-
tion in the wake of a productivity shock, while the empirically-estimated ex-
change rate depreciation rule lowered ination in the wake of an export price
shock. We also saw in Table 6 that real GDP volatility was largely explained
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by export-price volatility (74 percent) relative to productivity (4 percent). For
stabilizing welfare, not just ination, it made sense for the MAS to make use
of the exchange-rate depreciation rule rather than the Taylor rule, especially if
export price shocks had dominated. If, however, GDP were driven much more
by productivity relative to export price shocks, our analysis suggested that the
Taylor rule might have made more sense as a policy regime.
To assess the relative performance or comparative advantage of the two
policy regimes, we simulated the estimated model with the two optimal rules,
for the case of pure export price shocks and for the case of pure productivity
shocks. The volatility measures for ination, output gap, and the two policy
instruments (the interest rate and exchange rate) were computed.
Table 4 shows the comparative advantage of the two policy regimes. The
Taylor rule did a much better job in terms of ination volatility for recurring
productivity shocks. But, there was a volatility trade-o¤ with a switch to
an interest rate rule (compared to the exchange rate rule), in that ination
volatility fell but output-gap volatility increased. However, for recurring shocks
to export prices, we saw that switching from a Taylor rule to a depreciation rule
reduced by almost half the volatility of ination, while the output-gap volatility
fell slightly. Thus, for the case of recurrent export price shocks, the policy
regime based on ination-targeting exchange-rate management had the decided
comparative advantage over the Taylor rule.
Table 4: Comparing Policy Regimes: Volatility
Shocks  log (Y=Y flex) r s
Exchange Rate Rule
z 0.0244 0.0011 0.0247 0.0246
px 0.0029 0.0177 0.0028 0.0028
Taylor Rule
z 0.0172 0.0144 0.0038 0.1214
px 0.0047 0.0179 0.0041 0.0161
Source: Calculations from Monte Carlo markov chain simulations.
Gerlach and Tillman (2012) have argued that policy regime changes should
also be evaluated on the basis of their e¤ect on ination persistence. They
found that Asian countries which have switched to an ination-targeting regime
(with a Taylor rule) had reduced ination persistence. What are the e¤ects
of alternative ination-targeting regimes on ination persistence in Singapore?
Following Gerlach and Tillman, the following regression equation was estimated
to obtain an estimate of the persistence coe¢ cient  :
t = t 1 +
kX
i=1
it i + "t (45)
where t is ination, and "t is a normally-distributed innovation with variance
2":
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We estimated the persistence coe¢ cient  for the actual data, and obtained
a bootstrapped 95% condence interval. We then simulated the model (using
the estimated standard errors of all of the shocks), under the two policy regimes,
to nd the mean, median and condence intervals of ination persistence.
Table 5: Ination Persistenceb bmean bmedian b:025 b:975
Actual Ination 0.51 0.17 0.85
Exchange-Rate Rule 0.26 0.30 -0.40 0.71
Taylor Rule 0.85 0.94 0.12 1.06
Source: Calculations from Monte Carlo markov chain simulations.
Table 5 showed a condence interval of [0.17 0.85] for ination persistence
for actual observed data. Based on simulated data, the mean and median of
the persistence coe¢ cient for the exchange-rate rule was at the lower end of the
actual distribution, while the mean and median under the Taylor-rule regime
was at the upper end of the actual distribution. These results indicated that
the ination-targeting regime with the exchange-rate rule had a comparative
advantage over the Taylor rule ination-targeting regime for achieving lower
ination persistence.
5 Conclusion
This paper has specied a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the
Singapore economy. The model had seven stochastic shocks, namely: shocks to
productivity, government spending, foreign interest rates, foreign GDP, import
and export price ination, and the risk premium. The seven observables used in
the Bayesian estimation were domestic GDP growth, CPI ination, government
spending, foreign interest rates, foreign GDP growth, import price ination and
the risk premium. The sample period was from 1985 to 2009.
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) has adopted an exchange-rate
instrument to manage ination for this period. This paper showed that there
would have been no reason for Singapore to fear oating the exchange rate and
adopting a Taylor rule to manage ination. Given the structure of the shocks
impinging on the economy, welfare di¤erences would have been very minor.
The only trade-o¤ would have been in the volatility of the alternative policy
instruments. If the MAS had abandoned the exchange-rate rule in favor of
an interest rate rule, there would have been more exchange-rate volatility and
less interest-rate volatility, but not much else would have changed. This result
should not be surprising, since our Bayesian estimates showed that the degree of
price and wage exibility were relatively high in comparison with most advanced
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economies. With high nominal exibility, it should make little or no di¤erence
which type of monetary regime had been adopted.
However, this paper also showed that the choice of an exchange rate rule
made eminent sense, when export price shocks dominated domestic productivity
shocks as the source of real sector volatility. The exchange-rate rule appeared to
have a comparative advantage over the Taylor rule for stabilizing both ination
and the output gap in this situation, in addition to achieving lower ination
persistence relative to a Taylor rule.
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